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Bitcoin is a popular digital currency for online payments, realized as a decentralized peer-to-peer
electronic cash system. Bitcoin keeps a ledger of all transactions; the majority of the participants de-
cides on the correct ledger. Since there is no trusted third party to guard against double spending, and
inspired by its popularity, we would like to investigate the correctness of the Bitcoin protocol. Dou-
ble spending is an important threat to electronic payment systems. Double spending would happen
if one user could force a majority to believe that a ledger without his previous payment is the correct
one. We are interested in the probability of success of such a double spending attack, which is linked
to the computational power of the attacker. This paper examines the Bitcoin protocol and provides
its formalization as an UPPAAL model. The model will be used to show how double spending can
be done if the parties in the Bitcoin protocol behave maliciously, and with what probability double
spending occurs.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin [17] is a popular digital currency with over 81,398,896 transactions and 14,544,775 bitcoins in
circulation until August, 2015 [2]. Due to its popularity, many merchants have started accepting bitcoins,
such as a coffee shop located on the campus of one of the universities in Mexico [3]. Bitcoin eliminates
the need for a trusted third party, such as a broker or a bank, to process payments. Every peer in the
Bitcoin network keeps the collection of all transactions. This so-called ledger is organized in separate
blocks, which are linked to their predecessor, thus forming a chain. Each peer maintains its own chain.
This chain will work effectively for honest peers.
A system is not only composed of honest peers but also dishonest ones. If the peers deviate from
their expected behaviour, then the chain may fork and double spending may be possible. Recently, there
was a fork in the network that created two versions of the block-chain and it continued for six blocks [4].
That created the risk of double spending. Another reason that could increase the risk of double spending
is the size of the pools. In June, 2014, Ghash.io, one of the mining pools of the Bitcoin network, came
close to obtaining 51% of the Bitcoin network’s hash-rate [1]. This could have led to double spending if
the pool would have behaved maliciously.
Bitcoin attracted attention of researchers who worked on different aspects of the protocol. Bergstra
et. al. identified research questions related to Bitcoin and other information money [11]. Ron et. al. did
quantitative analysis of the Bitcoin transaction graph [20]. Herrmann did the implementation, evaluation
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and detection of a double-spending attack [15]. The Bitcoin protocol has been modeled before to analyze
different properties. Beukema developed a model in mCRL2 and verified properties such as double
spending [12]. This model consisted only of peers that are responsible for mining as well. Block-chain
forking was not investigated. Andrychowicz et. al. modeled Bitcoin contracts using timed automata [7].
Bastiaan did stochastic analysis of two-phase proof-of-work in the Bitcoin protocol [10]. This work was
based on predicting the rate at which miners generate coins. However, it did not include block-chain
forking. Our research focuses on block-chain forking and the probability of double spending, taking into
account that the block-chain can be influenced by a malicious pool.
This paper focuses on the formal modeling of the Bitcoin protocol, developed in the UPPAAL model
checker. It also presents the preliminary results of our probability analysis for double-spending attacks,
based on the number of confirmations. This model will be used in the future to further analyze double-
spending attacks, based on the computational power of the pools.
Organization of the paper. The next section introduces the Bitcoin protocol. A discussion on the
model is presented in Section 3. Appendix A shows the full description of the Bitcoin protocol in
UPPAAL. Our basic analysis of this protocol is discussed in Section 4. The paper concludes with a
discussion on future possibilities for analysis, based on the developed model, in Section 5.
2 The Bitcoin Protocol
The Bitcoin protocol proposed by Nakamoto is described as a peer-to-peer electronic cash system [17].
The Bitcoin protocol is a decentralized payment system. There is no trusted third party, such as a bank or
a broker, as used in traditional payment systems to guard against double spending. In this online payment
system, a payer sends a payment directly to a payee. Bitcoin is a digital currency based on cryptographic
principles. Every peer knows about every other peer’s transactions; this is unlike a centralized system
(Bank) where only the central authority knows about all transactions. Each peer in the Bitcoin network
can be a payer (customer) or payee (vendor) or both. To start using the Bitcoin protocol, the user needs
a Bitcoin account and a wallet. A prerequisite for a user is to have a private and a public key pair, first of
all because the account is identified by the public key. Also, a payer needs to know the public key of the
payee to make a payment. The next subsection will discuss the basic terminology.
2.1 Terminology
The following cryptography and payment terminology is used by the Bitcoin protocol [8].
• One-way hash function: Bitcoin uses the double-SHA256 hashing algorithm to hash transactions
and to solve proof-of-work puzzles.
• E-wallet: An e-wallet is a database that stores bitcoins and their corresponding transaction hashes.
It is usually referred to as the bitcoin wallet which can be software, mobile or web-based.
• Bitcoin: Bitcoin is a digital currency exchanged between parties over the Bitcoin network. BTC
or B is the currency symbol for bitcoin.
• Proof-of-work: A cryptographic puzzle (also known as a challenge) is based on Adam Back’s
Hashcash [9]. Originally, Hashcash was developed as an anti-spam email tool, where stamps are
created and attached to the email. A random number is added to the email header and then a hash
is performed on the header. A hash string is considered valid if it has a value equal to some set
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target. In case of an invalid hash string, another random number is selected, added to the header
and the hash is computed again. This process continues until a valid hash string is obtained. The
recipient checks for the validity of the date and email address in the hash string and adds the hash
string into the database. If the hash string is already present in the database, that hash string is
invalid. Bitcoin uses Hashcash for block validity too. Miners perform proof-of-work calculations
on recently broadcasted transaction blocks. This process is called mining and is performed by
mining software. Mining yields bitcoins for the miner as a reward.
• Block-chain: The block-chain is a public ledger which stores processed transactions.
If a user wants to make a payment, that user has to create a transaction with all relevant information,
i.e., the address of the payee, the amount of bitcoins and a challenge. This transaction is then broadcasted
to all nodes in the network. Each node places this transaction into a block and tries to solve the proof-of-
work for this block. Once a node finds a solution to the challenge, it broadcasts it to all other nodes. If
all transactions are valid and not spent before, then the other nodes accept the block and start working on
the next block in the chain. At certain times, the chain may have forks because two blocks were mined
and broadcasted at the same time. Nodes always consider the longest block-chain to be the correct one.
The following subsections will discuss transactions, blocks and the block-chain in more detail.
2.2 Transactions
There are two types of transactions: coin-base and regular transactions [18]. Coin-base transactions are
used for new bitcoins, whereas regular transactions are used for transferring existing bitcoins from one
user to another. Each transaction has one or more transaction inputs and outputs. A transaction input is
a reference to an output of the previous transaction, which proves that the sender possesses the bitcoins it
claims to have. A transaction input contains the response corresponding to the challenge of the previous
transaction output. A transaction output determines the amount to be transferred to a payee account.
Transaction outputs consist of an amount in BTC and a challenge, which specifies the conditions under
which this output transaction can be claimed.
2.3 Blocks
A block is a set of transactions. Transactions in the same block can be considered to have happened at
the same time. Transactions are only confirmed if they appear in some block. Unconfirmed transactions
are kept in a transaction pool. Any node can create a block of transactions and broadcast it to the rest of
the network. Since there can be many block creators, the network needs to decide which block should be
added to the chain next, as the blocks can arrive in a different order to different peers. The protocol uses
the proof-of-work solution to induce a unique order on blocks.
This proof-of-work solution is accomplished by the mining process. Mining is done by peers, called
miners, or even by pools of miners. Initially, ordinary peers could participate in the mining process.
Since the difficulty for finding a solution to the proof-of-work increased over the years, peers started
working together in groups to solve the challenges. Such a group is called a pool. Today, there are many
pools available with different percentages of participation in the Bitcoin network as shown in Figure 1
(August, 2015)[6]. Pool BitFury occupies 15% of the network hash-rate. The network hash-rate (hashes
per second) is a measure for the processing power of the Bitcoin network. Related to the network hash-
rate, the Bitcoin network has a global block difficulty which is automatically adapted after every 2016
blocks. It is a measure to ensure that it is not too easy to solve the challenges with the current network
hash-rate. This difficulty is based on a target value: the miners must find a block solution less than the
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Figure 1: Pools with percentage hash-rate
target value. So the target value is a maximum hash. A decrease in target value means an increase in
difficulty. On 1st August, 2015, the network hash rate was 413,204,212.12 GH/s and the difficulty was
52,278,304,845.59 [5]. The average time taken to find a solution by a particular pool is based on the
hash-rate of that pool. The time is calculated using Equation 1 [10].
Time =
difficulty∗232
hash-rate
(1)
For example, the average time taken to find a block solution by BitFurry is:
Time =
52,278,304,845.59∗232
0.15∗ (413,204,212.12)
= 3622 s' 60 mins
(2)
To solve a challenge, miners in a pool randomly select a so-called nonce for a block. The hash of
the block (including this nonce) is calculated and the result is compared with the target value. If the
hash of the block is lower than the target value, then the proof-of-work is solved; otherwise the miners
randomly select another nonce and calculate the hash again. This process repeats until a nonce is found
that results in a hash value lower than the target value. Once a nonce is found, the block becomes valid
and is broadcasted. On average, it takes about ten minutes for a pool to find a solution. Peers receiving
this block can easily verify the solution by taking the hash of the block. Note, that the new block created
by peers should include the hash of the most recent block on the longest path in the block-chain. Recall
that every peer has its own version of the block-chain. The first block, called the genesis block, is mined
with the maximum target value.
The next section describes how blocks are used to form a chain.
2.4 Block-Chain
The block-chain is used to provide an order on the transactions, whereas the transaction chain is used
to track the ownership history. Every valid block that is broadcasted joins the longest path of the chain,
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appending it to a predecessor in the longest chain. A block can only be added to the chain if it contains
a hash of some previous block in the chain. A chain is formed by linking blocks which have a hash
of a previous block in the block-chain. This defines an ordering of the blocks, thus preventing double
spending.
A chain can have different paths but the longest path is the valid one. Transactions in blocks that are
not in the longest chain are added back to the pool of transactions, and they can be used to build new
blocks. This process allows miners to select the newest block from the chain to create the next block.
Selection of an older block can result in a shorter branch and making this branch grow longer than the
current longest branch will require a lot of effort. Whenever a block becomes part of the block-chain,
the miners are rewarded. The reward is included in every mined block as a coin-base transaction. This
coin-base transaction is the first transaction in the block. This incentive will tempt miners to select the
newest block.
Since bitcoins are used over a large network, in which peers and pools can even be temporarily
disconnected, there is a possibility that two blocks are created and broadcasted over the network simul-
taneously. Some peers might receive the first block and other peers the second one. In this situation,
peers will continue building the chain on the received block. This will be resolved when a new block will
be broadcasted, received by all, since one of them makes the longest chain. This shows that the blocks
which are at the end of the chain could be less secure, compared to the blocks at the start of the chain.
The transactions in the block at the end of the chain should not be considered confirmed as there is a
non-negligible possibility that another chain will become the longest.
Double spending is spending a coin twice. It is possible in Bitcoin if the block-chain can be influ-
enced. There are different scenarios for double spending such as the race attack, Finney’s attack, the
brute force attack, and the > 50% attack [19]. The last attack relies on the hash-rate percentage of a
pool. We are looking at double spending based on the hash-rate of pools, and how a pool can race in
order to make its chain longer. This scenario is described in the next section.
3 Bitcoin Model Discussion
We have used the UPPAAL statistical model checker to model and analyze the Bitcoin protocol [14]. The
model consists of four types of automata: pool, peer, malicious peer and malicious pool. A peer creates
transactions and places them in the transaction pool. A pool gets transactions from the transaction pool,
includes them in a block and proceeds to the mining step. Upon successful mining, the mined block is
broadcasted to other peers and pools for inclusion in the block-chain.
A malicious peer and pool collaborate together to cheat the system. The malicious peer creates two
transactions of the same input, places one in the transaction pool for other pools to mine and gives the
other one to the malicious pool. After the first transaction has been included in the chain, the malicious
pool adds the block with the malicious transaction to the chain, creating a fork. The race is between
these two chains. If the chain with the malicious transaction exceeds the length of the chain with the first
transaction then the former becomes valid and all pools continue building blocks on the wrong chain.
The detailed model description is presented in Appendix A. This model was built with the intention to
investigate the probability of double spending in relation to the pool size. We have abstracted the size of
the pool by the rate at which blocks are generated by each pool. This rate is calculated using Equation 1
in Section 2.
It was difficult to model the block-chain in UPPAAL due to the limited support for unbounded data
structures. A fork in the block-chain leads to a side chain. The longest chain is the main chain. A side
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Figure 2: Block-chain fork with identifiers and length indicators
Figure 3: Number of blocks generated by each pool
chain could increase in length as well and possibly become the main chain later on. Therefore, it was
important for us to store all chains. We modeled a block-chain by a list of triples, which store the current
block number, the previous block number and the length of the chain to that block. For example, the
following is the block-chain structure for the block-chain shown in Figure 2.
{[1,0,1],[2,1,2],[3,2,3],[4,3,4],[5,4,5],[6,5,6],[7,2,3],[8,7,4],[9,8,5]}
In Figure 2, the length for the chain to block number 9 is 5 and the length of the chain to block number
6 is 6. So the former is the side chain and the latter is the main chain. The length stored in the chain was
used to determine the longest chain, to insert a block in the longest chain and to check whether a block
is in the longest chain.
To ensure the accuracy of the model, we simulated the model several times. We checked whether
each functionality included in the model is working correctly and according to the Bitcoin protocol. One
of the main functionalities includes validating a transaction before including it in a block. To test this
functionality, we created a malicious peer who was responsible for sending negative or zero amounts,
and already spent transactions. The model behaved as expected. Simulation was also done to validate
the structure of the block-chain at each pool. Since we have abstracted the size of the pool by the hash-
rate of the network, we simulated to validate whether the hash-rate corresponds to the number of blocks
generated in the main chain. In theory, a pool with a high hash-rate generates a larger number of blocks.
Figure 3 shows the result of this simulation. Pool 4 has 50% network hash-rate while Pools 1, 2 and
3 have 10%, 18% and 22%, respectively. Our result validates that Pool 4 has created and successfully
mined more blocks than the other pools.
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4 Basic Analysis of the Bitcoin Protocol
Double spending is possible in fast payment transactions according to Karame et. al. [16]. Recall that
blocks in the main chain are less secure towards the end. Therefore, vendors should wait for a certain
number of confirmations, before considering a transaction in a block confirmed. The number of confir-
mations is the depth of a block from the end of the chain. For a vendor to consider a transaction to be
confirmed, it has been mentioned [13] that the vendors need to wait for at least a depth of 6 blocks in the
main chain. Based on this, we wanted to examine the relation between the hash-rate of a pool and the
double-spending attack, following the scenario described in Section 3.
We did the analysis on the possibility of double spending for depths of 1-4 blocks. The result pre-
sented in Table 1 is based on four peers and four pools. The hash-rate for the pools are 18%, 22% ,10%
and 50%. The last one is the malicious pool. There are 3 honest peers and 1 malicious peer. The ma-
licious peer collaborates with the malicious pool for the double-spending attack. The upper bound for
the transactions and the blocks are set to 200. The query given below was used to get the probability of
double spending by simulation:
Pr[#<=500000](<> Pool4.checkBlockinChain(Pool4.MBlock))
The malicious transaction by the malicious peer is included in the block MBlock mined by Pool 4.
The function checkBlockinChain() checks whether this block is in the longest chain or not. If it is, the
double spending has occurred. For each confirmation depth 1-4, this query was executed for five hundred
thousand steps.
Table 1: Probability of double spending based on the confirmation depth
No. of Confirmation Probability of Double Spending Runs
1 [0.870781, 0.970278] 118
2 [0.855061, 0.954924] 140
3 [0.797987, 0.897941] 211
4 [0.734029, 0.833722] 277
Our results show that double spending is still possible with a depth of 4 blocks. The probability
was approximately above 80% for a depth of 4 blocks. The reason could be the hash-rate of the pool.
However detailed analysis on double spending with different hash-rates is still needed.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
This paper presented a model of the Bitcoin protocol in the UPPAAL model checker and described how
the important characteristics of the protocol have been modeled. The model was developed with the
aim of investigating double spending in an environment where some peers are dishonest. This paper
showed how a malicious pool could abuse its computational power and race against the network to
include a malicious transaction in the longest chain. By statistical model checking, we analyzed how
the probability that a malicious transaction is included in the longest chain, depends on the number of
confirmations. The results suggest that the double-spending attack is possible for the parameters used in
this scenario. However, our analysis is not complete yet, as we want to investigate also double spending
with different hash-rates.
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Future research is to do rigorous analysis of the Bitcoin protocol using this model. One could in-
vestigate the malicious act of a pool under different network hash-rates. Also, it would be interesting
to model the block-chain for the Bitcoin protocol with two-phase proof-of-work [10], and compare the
probability of double spending with the standard Bitcoin protocol with single proof-of-work.
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A Description of the Bitcoin Protocol in UPPAAL
This section provides the models and their description for the Bitcoin protocol. Block-chain, blocks
and transactions form an integral component of the Bitcoin protocol. The validity of a transaction is
dependent on the block-chain. If the block of a particular transaction is included in the main chain, then
it can be considered confirmed. Due to its importance, we have modeled block-chains together with
blocks and transactions. There are two parties involved: pools and peers. A Pool is a group of miners
responsible for solving the proof-of-work problem for individual blocks. Each Pool maintains its own
block-chain. A Peer can be a customer or a vendor who is responsible for transferring bitcoins from one
peer to another by creating transactions. Peers do not take part in the mining process. This model will
show the interaction between these two parties.
The next subsection will discuss the data structure used to store all necessary information (transac-
tions and blocks) in this protocol.
A.1 Global Declarations
Declaration 1 shows the structure of a transaction. A transaction is made up of an input and output
transaction. Input transactions, TXIN, contain the previous transaction. This means that this transaction
is based on the output of the previous transaction (positive BTC). Output transactions, TXOUT, contain
the Address of the peer and the amount value. Note that in the Bitcoin protocol a transaction does not
have a sequence number. Instead, it has hash. We have abstracted this by a number in our model. To
maintain the uniqueness of transactions, we have the transaction number Tx num stored and incremented
globally. Tx num is initialized to PEERS. This is because every peer will have one transaction to start off.
Variable status is used to indicate the status of a transaction. It can be in three states; UNCONFIRMED,
CONFIRMED and INVALID. Initially, a transaction is UNCONFIRMED. Once it is included in a block
it is CONFIRMED. If it can not be included in a block, its status will be INVALID. INVALID is used to
indicate to other pools that this transaction should not be included in a block. An invalid transaction has
a negative or zero value in the output transaction, or it has already been spent.
Transactions are placed in a block. Declaration 2 provides the structure of a block. Every block has a
unique block number, a previous block number that forms a link to the main chain, and the transactions.
A block also contains a hash. We have represented it as a number Block num which is maintained
globally. Block num is initialized to 2. The first new block created by a pool will be numbered 2. Block
number 1 is reserved for the first (genesis) block.
We have also defined a structure Wallet shown in Declaration 3. Every peer will have a wallet to
maintain unspent output from every transaction.
Other global declarations include channels and variables. Channel blockSolution is used to broadcast
blocks to other pools and peers. This channel is used when a pool has found a block solution. Chan-
nel request and send are used to request and send predecessors of orphan blocks. There are two meta
variables used in this model. One is Blocknum used for storing block numbers when synchronizing on
channel request and the second is chain used to store block details when broadcasting a block solution.
In the Bitcoin protocol, when a peer creates a transaction it broadcasts it over the network. A pool
collects those transaction and places it in its pool. Instead of having a transaction pool for each pool, we
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Declaration 1 Transaction Datatype in UPPAAL
const int MAX_BTC_AMOUNT = 12;
const int MAX_TRANSACTION = 200;
const int PEERS = 4;
typedef int[0,PEERS] PEER;
typedef int[0,MAX_BTC_AMOUNT] AMOUNT;
typedef int[0,MAX_TRANSACTION]TXNUMBER;
typedef int[0,2] STATUS;
//output transaction
typedef struct{
PEER Address;
AMOUNT value;
}TXOUT;
//input transaction
typedef struct{
TXNUMBER id;
}TXIN;
//transaction
typedef struct {
TXNUMBER Id;
TXIN TxInput;
TXOUT TxOutput[2];
STATUS status;
}Tx;
TXNUMBER Tx_num = PEERS;
Declaration 2 Block Datatype
typedef int[0,HASHSIZE] BLOCKHASH;
typedef struct {
BLOCKHASH num;
BLOCKHASH prevBlocknum;
Tx tx;
}Block;
BLOCKHASH Block_num = 2;
Declaration 3 Wallet Datatype
typedef struct{
TXNUMBER Id;
AMOUNT value;
}Wallet;
have created a global transaction pool; Tx TxPool[MAX TRANSACTION].
The following subsections will discuss the two parties involved in the Bitcoin protocol.
A.2 Pool
Figure 4 shows the timed automaton Pool. This automaton has four locations; Initial, Wait, Verify and
Mine. There are some local declarations, for the block-chain, the index of the longest chain and the length
of the longest chain. We have implemented a block-chain as an array of integers, chain[HASHSIZE][3].
This array records the block number, the previous block number, the length of the chain to that block,
and the ID of this pool (in case this block was created by this pool). The reason behind storing only
block numbers and the previous block number is to achieve simplicity of the chain description. The
third field in the array is used for the length of the chain. The fourth field is used for verification
purposes only, to determine the number of blocks created by a particular pool. The local variables
56 Modeling and Verification of the Bitcoin Protocol
Figure 4: Pool automaton
indexLongestChain and lengthLongestChain are used to store the index and the length of the longest
chain, respectively. These variables are used during block generation. The block-chain contains only
block numbers in our model. Other details included in a block, such as transactions, are stored in an
array confirmedBlock[MAX BLOCK]. Variable confirmedBlock stores all blocks mined by any pool.
There can be orphan blocks in the protocol. Orphan blocks are those whose predecessor is not in any
chain. Therefore, an array is defined for orphan blocks, orphanBlock[MAX BLOCK]. Variables localTx
and localBlocknum are used to store intermediate results when verifying transactions and processing
orphans.
This automaton models the three tasks of the pool. The first task is verifying and placing a transaction
in a block. The second is mining the block to solve the proof-of-work challenge. Upon successful mining,
the block is broadcasted to other pools and peers. The final task is maintaining the block-chain by adding
blocks received from other pools, and requesting the predecessors of orphans.
The automaton starts from location Initial, taking a transition to Wait. During the transition, the
automata initializes the block chain chain and sets the first block in the chain to 1. So when the first
block is created by this pool, it should refer to block 1 as the previous block. At the location Wait, there
are 5 outgoing edges and the rest are incoming edges, synchronized on channels with other automata.
If there are unconfirmed transactions in the transaction pool then the transition with the guard
checkTxPool() will be enabled. The automaton will transit to location Verify if this transition is taken.
The function getTransaction() copies the transaction into localTx and sets this transaction as confirmed in
the transaction pool. The verifyTransaction() function checks the transaction for negative or zero values
in the output section and it also compares the input of this transaction and the total value of the output
transactions with the transactions in the main chain. The latter implements the double-spending check.
If the input transaction number and the total value match with another transaction, then the input of this
transaction has already been spent. Thus, the automaton transits to Wait, setting the transaction status
in the pool as INVALID. If the check succeeds, then the automaton transits to the Mine location. The
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location Mine has the rate of exponential set to 1:rateX. This rateX is calculated from Equation 1 in
Section 2.
At this location, if a pool solves the proof-of-work challenge then it takes a transition to loca-
tion Wait by broadcasting the block to other pools and peers on channel blockSolution. The function
updateBlockChain() adds the block with the block number stored in Block num and the transaction
stored in the localTx to confirmedBlock. This function also updates the global variable chain, incre-
ments Block num, resets localTx and adds the block number and the previous block number to its block-
chain chain. The block found by the pool will always be added to the main chain and it will refer to
the last block in the main chain. The index of the last block in the main chain is stored in variable
indexLongestChain.
If some other pool solves the proof-of-work challenge, then this pool will take the transition to the
Wait location by receiving the block on channel blockSolution. The function addBlock() checks if the
received block’s parent is in the chain and if it is, then the block is added to confirmedBlock. The block
number and the previous block number are added to the block-chain chain. It also sets the transaction
that it included in the block being mined to UNCONFIRMED. If the parent is not in the chain, then
this block is an orphan and it is added to orphanBlock. In either case, the transition is from the Mine
to the Wait location. Likewise, if a pool is at the Wait location, it can also receive a block on channel
blockSolution.
If there is no transaction in the transaction pool, the transition with the guard !checkTxPool will be
taken. If a pool has orphan blocks in the orphanBlock, then the transition with the guard checkOrphan()
will be enabled. This will let the pool request for the parent of the orphan block on channel request. The
function requestBlock() updates the global variable blocknum with the block number of the parent. The
automaton synchronizing on channel request will copy the value of Blocknum to localBlocknum. It will
then check whether a block with block number localBlocknum is present in the confirmedBlock. If it is,
then the block information is saved in the local variable sendBlock. When sendBlock has information in it,
the transition with the condition sendBlock.num != 0 is enabled. The transition will be taken on channel
send, updating sendBlock values to zero. The synchronizing automaton adds the block in the chain and
in confirmedBlock if it does not have that block and will process orphan blocks from orphanBlock by
adding to the chain. That block will then be removed from orphanBlock.
The next subsection describes the Peer automaton.
A.3 Peer
Figure 5 shows the Peer automaton. Just like pools, peers also keep track of the block-chain using
variables chain and confirmedBlock. The block-chain is needed for a peer to check and update the wallet
if there is any transaction which has the output address as the peer’s ID and it is included in the main
chain. The main functionality of the peer is to create the transaction and to update the wallet. The Peer
automaton has two locations: Initial and Wait.
The first transition from Initial to Wait is taken to initialize the chain and the wallet. The chain is
initialized as described in A.2. All peers will initially be given ten bitcoins with an initial transaction.
This will be updated in the wallet. With this, peers can send bitcoins to another peer by creating trans-
actions. The transition on creating transactions will be enabled if there are bitcoins in the wallet and
if the current transaction number Tx num is less then the maximum transaction MAX TRANSACTION.
The select statement add:int[0,PEERS-1] allows peers to send bitcoins to any peer. The selected peer
address add will be passed as parameter into the function create Transaction(add). This function gets
the index of the wallet where a positive bitcoin value is available, searches for an empty index in TxPool
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Figure 5: Peer automaton
and updates TxPool with the current transaction number Tx num, the input transaction extracted from the
wallet, the address of the peer (receiver), and the amount (always 1). If there is any amount left then the
peer needs to send it back to itself. The function will also set the value of the transaction in the wallet to
0. This means that this peer cannot use this transaction as an input transaction in another one.
The next transition checks if there are no bitcoins in the wallet; it will be taken if there is none.
To update the wallet, the condition checkTxOutput() needs to be satisfied. It checks the main chain to
see if there is any transaction that has an output with this peer’s ID that has not been recorded in the
wallet previously. If that is the case, then this transition is taken, and the wallet is updated by function
updateWallet.
The last transition is on adding blocks to the block-chain using function addBlock() as described in
subsection A.2.
In this model, all peers and pools are connected to each other. So there will not be any forks in the
chain unless there is a malicious peer and pool. The following subsections will discuss the malicious
pool and peer.
A.4 Malicious Pool
The purpose of the malicious pool in our model is to race against the network, in order to increase the
length of its chain. We wanted to see whether it is possible for a malicious pool to race even when it is
some blocks behind. This scenario is further illustrated in Figure 2. Suppose a malicious peer has spent
bitcoins to some other peer and the transaction is included in block 3. This malicious peer contacts the
malicious pool so that the spent bitcoins can be transferred back to this peer. The malicious pool creates
a fork in the chain by adding and linking block number 7 to block number 2. Note that the malicious
pool has to assign the predecessor of block 7 as block 2 since the first transaction is included in block 3.
Therefore, the malicious pool has to race to make its chain longer than the chain of the honest pools. If
it succeeds, then a successful double spending has occurred.
Figure 6 shows the malicious pool automaton. This automaton is the same as automaton Pool, except
that there are two additional transitions. The first transition checks if there is any transaction from the
malicious peer and whether that transaction has been included in the chain. It also checks for the number
of confirmations to wait for, so that the peer to which this transaction was made, could believe that the
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Figure 6: Malicious pool automaton
Figure 7: Malicious peer automaton
transaction has been confirmed. The transition will be taken if the condition is true.
The second transition is from location Wait to Mine. It will be enabled if there is a transaction with the
same transaction input as the first transaction created by the malicious peer (malicious transaction) and
the first transaction has been included in the chain with some blocks of confirmation. If both conditions
are satisfied, then the malicious transaction will be copied into the localTx and the malicious transaction
pool will be reset. At the location Mine, the pool will mine a block with this transaction and will broadcast
this block while transiting from location Mine to Wait. The race flag raceflag will be set when there is
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a malicious transaction and this flag will be set to false when this malicious transaction is included in a
block by this pool. This flag is used when receiving blocks at location Mine. It will not allow this pool to
receive any block until this transaction is included in a block. The block with the malicious transaction
will be added to the chain, thus creating a fork. This fork will lead to two chains: the main chain and a
side chain. Honest pools will continue building blocks on the main chain while the malicious pool will
continue on the side chain. A possible result is shown in Figure 2. The malicious pool will also keep
track of the chain built by the others in the network and will monitor when its side chain gets longer than
the main chain. When that happens, the main chain for all pools will be same. Other transitions are the
same as for normal pools, as described in Subsection A.2.
A.5 Malicious Peer
The malicious peer will create two transactions, which will have the same transaction input. The first
transaction will be placed in the transaction pool TxPool, so other pools can include it in a block and
proceed to the mining step. The second transaction will be given to the malicious pool. Figure 7 shows
the malicious peer automaton. One new function is introduced, createDuplicateTransaction(). The pur-
pose of this function is to create a malicious transaction and place it in a malicious transaction pool. The
malicious peer automaton creates only two transactions.
